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Sessão 11 | Seminários de Investigação MLAG 2022/2023

From: 2023-04-26 To:2023-04-26

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  • Thematic Line


    Modern & Contemporary Philosophy
  • Research Group


    Mind, Language & Action
  • 26 de abril 2023 (quarta-feira)

    10h30 | Sala do Departamento de Filosofia (Torre B - Piso 1)

    Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto

     

    Sessão 11 

    The Pretense Theory of Understanding Nonsense

    Krystian Bogucki (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences - Warsaw, Poland)

     

    Abstract: Typically, if I understand a sentence, then it expresses a proposition that I entertain. Nonsensical sentences don’t express propositions, but there are contexts in which we talk about understanding nonsensical sentences. For example, we accept various kinds of semantically defective sentences in fiction, philosophy, and everyday life. Furthermore, it is a standard assumption that if a sentence is nonsensical, then it makes no sense to say that it implies anything or is implied by other sentences. Semantically uninterpreted sentences don’t have logical characteristics. Hence, the riddle of understanding nonsense arises. We seem to use nonsensical sentences in reasoning, thinking, judging, and drawing conclusions, but they convey no propositions, which are the vehicles of their semantic properties. In this talk, I propose a pretence theory of understanding nonsense to explain this riddle. Moreover, I discuss alternative frameworks that are insufficient to solve the riddle of understanding nonsense.  Firstly, I point out the shortcomings of Manish Oza’s (2022) account of nonsense. Secondly, I show that L. J. Keller and J. A. Keller’s (2021) and Recanati’s (1997) positions, which attempt to solve the riddle of understanding nonsense by means the language of thought hypothesis, are not satisfactory.

     

     

    Seminários de Investigação MLAG 2022/2023: https://ifilosofia.up.pt/activities/seminarios-de-investigacao-mlag-2022-2023

     

    Organização:
    André Silva
    Avelino Costa
    Daniel Pires Nunes
    João Faria e Silva
    José Xarez
    Marcondes Rocha Carvalho
    Maria Maia
    Rafael Padilha
    Raul Vasques
    Ricardo Serrado
    Sâmara Costa
    (Estudantes de mestrado e doutoramento de Filosofia da FLUP)
    Mind, Language and Action Group (MLAG)
    Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto – FIL/00502
    Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

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